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Introduction
For many years, anthropological studies have been acknowledging the need to 
introduce the concepts of ethnomedicine, ethnomathematics and, more in general, of 
ethnosciences1. This implies the need for a concept of ethnophilosophy: even philosophical 
tradition, the most defining trait of Western culture, must no longer be considered as a 
uniquely Western product. There is no reason to deny Eastern thought the title of Eastern 
philosophy, no matter how much it diverges from the European way of thinking.
In this article, I would like to propose a new understanding of human thinking. A 
distinction can be made between no less than two modes of thought: thinking through 
images and thinking through words, that is, visual thinking and verbal reasoning. These 
two modes of thought correspond to what Aristotle respectively defined as noetic thought 
and dianoetic thought (Calogero 1967/2012, 1968). 
Thought cannot be reduced to verbal reasoning. This also implies that non-human 
animals do think as well: they are capable of a visual mode of thought. Non-human animals 
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Abstract: After the publication of Jaques Derrida’s book, L’animal que donc je suis, 
anti-speciesism has been looking for a theoretical foundation for its ethical content. In 
my opinion, the defect of all these philosophical perspectives is that they still reduce 
animals to objects of human philosophy. Here, I develop a new framework in which 
animals are considered as subjects of their own philosophy. In analogy to the concept 
of ethnophilosophy, the concept of speciophilosophy is here introduced (§ 1, §3). 
The different ways of thinking between humans and other animals are outlined, by 
explaining the difference between verbal reasoning and thinking through images (§ 2). 
Human philosophies are shown to be anthropocentric ideologies, related to carnivorism 
(§4, § 8). Subsequently, animal speciophilosophies are discussed (§6) and a dialogical 
symphilosophein (§ 5) among all living beings is proposed to be the extension of the 
so-called philosophy of dialogue. Finally, it is shown how this perspective was present 
in the original Christian ethics (§7, §9, § 10).
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also possess specific verbal languages to communicate with one another. The specific 
character of human thinking is nothing but a synthesis of visual thinking and verbal 
language into verbal reasoning: this mode of thought has embedded visual thinking into 
a dialogical praxis, thereby allowing for abstractions from life in the form of written texts. 
Western philosophy, at least after Socrates, has developed through written culture, 
but other ethnophilosophies have been developing organically, with life itself. If this 
is true, the concept of speciophilosophy may be introduced: there exists a multitude of 
philosophies not only as related to different human ethnic groups, but to different species 
that hold different worldviews, different ways of thinking and living. 
Understanding non-human beings is impossible within the framework of human 
philosophy, as it will imply some kind of dialogue with non-human beings, achieved 
through an experience of participant observation aimed at understanding and learning 
animal philosophies. One school of ancient philosophy was called Cynicism only out of a 
sense of disdain. However, the time is ripe to truly understand animal philosophies, to 
respect all other living beings and even to improve our way of thinking and living.
1. Ethnophilosophy 
For many years, anthropological studies have been acknowledging the need 
to introduce the concepts of ethnomedicine, ethnomathematics and, more generally, 
ethnosciences (Ascher 1991; Erickson 2008; Scheps & Arom 1993). This implies the need 
for a concept of ethnophilosophy (see also Garfield &  Edelglass 2014; Hountondji 1996; 
Kearney 1984; Osha 2011; Pulak & Chandan 2005; Radin 2003; Sefa Dei 2011; Sefa Dei et 
al. 2000; Worsley 1997). Even philosophical tradition, the most defining trait of Western 
culture, must no longer be considered as a uniquely Western product. There is no reason to 
deny Eastern thought the title of Eastern philosophy. Indeed, Western tradition has often 
regarded Eastern thought as too linked to mythical or religious reasoning to be defined 
as a “philosophy” (Husserl 1936/1954), and there certainly exist differences between 
Eastern and Western thought. However, Western thought shows no clear detachment 
from myth or religion, either: Parmenides wrote poetry and Plato used myths. One must 
also recognize that every philosophical or scientific concept has mythical roots: space 
and time, force and energy, truth and rectitude, beauty, justice and love are forms of 
secularized deities (Santillana & von Dechend 1969).
Thus, one can speak of philosophy, or more accurately of ethnophilosophy, in 
relation to every facet of humankind, every current of thought, every understanding of 
life and of the world.
2. Verbal Reasoning and Thinking through Images
What does it actually mean to think? Here, I would like to propose a new 
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understanding of human thinking. A distinction can be made between no less than two 
human modes of thought: thinking through images and thinking through words, in other 
words, visual thinking and verbal reasoning. These two modes of thought correspond to 
what Aristotle defined respectively as noetic thought and dianoetic thought (Calogero 
1968). As a matter of fact, all ancient Greek philosophies can be understood in terms of 
the relationship between visual thinking and verbal reasoning (Calogero 1967/2012). 
Mythical thinking is essentially visual thinking, whereas Western philosophical thought 
is essentially verbal reasoning. This shift can be traced back to the transition from the 
iconic symbolism of ideograms and mythograms to an alphabetic, phonetic, linear writing 
system (Leroi-Gourhan 1964). Visual thinking is indeed a more complex mode of thought, 
as it is non-linear, non-sequential, and three-dimensional: it was the most ancient mode 
of thought, but it is also the form of future “parallel” (computer) thinking (Bailey 1996). 
Furthermore, although verbal reasoning is dominant in logic-linguistic thought, when 
one needs to think fast, one comes back to visual thinking, simply constructing a mental 
picture of the situation (Calogero 1960, Volume 1, 12–24). Dreaming is a kind of visual 
and, more generally, “sensory” thinking. However, visual thinking is not merely a form of 
automatic or unconscious thought. Pure (ancient) geometrical thought is a kind of visual 
thinking: in this respect, mathematical thinking, for its correlation to a non-alphabetic, 
non-phonetic, non-linear writing system, represents a mode of thought entirely different 
from philosophical thinking. This contradicts the idea that thinking through images is a 
less rigorous mode of thought than verbal reasoning. A shape such as a circle is definite 
in that it has exact properties, which cannot be confused with the properties of another 
shape, such as a square. Furthermore, poetic imagery and visual arts are also examples of 
visual thinking, as painter René Magritte has shown.
3. Non-human Animal Thinking and Speciophilosophy
Thus, thinking cannot be reduced to verbal reasoning. This has many implications. 
The human presumption to be the sole being capable of thought has always been related 
to our definition of thought in terms of verbal reasoning. Thus, the most important 
implication is that, although they are not capable of verbal reasoning, non-human animals 
with a nervous system capable of vision must also be capable of visual thinking. Only 
through this consciousness of the primary visual character of thinking can one understand 
that thought does not manifest itself in human beings alone, and overcome the foundation 
on which anthropocentrism and speciesism have been erected.
Non-human animals also possess specific verbal languages to communicate with 
one another (Sebeok 1991). However, these animal languages appear starkly different 
from human language: they are strictly related to immediate, vital situations, they are 
not articulated in alphabetical phonemes, and they are totally devoid of conceptual 
abstractions. They are instead expressions of perception, of sensation, of feeling and 
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affection, direct exchanges of vital information with no crystallization or accumulation 
of meaning in symbols or signs recorded in outside supports. Thus, these languages 
are not preserved in written culture: non-human animal culture is a kind of material 
culture characterized by non-written symbolism (see also Beck 1980; Bisconti 2008; 
Bonner 1983; Laland & Galef 2009). Indeed, non-human animal languages are able to 
communicate perceptive, emotional-affective and cognitive experiences, but they never 
function as an autonomous elaboration of knowledge, independent from experience or 
anticipating experience, a function that Kant would define as human pure reason (cf. Kant 
1787).
Thus, there exists an animal mode of thought which works through the internal 
association of images, a sort of inner ideation and vision. Any differences with human 
thought are simply differences in content and degree of elaboration; thus, there is no 
substantial difference between one and the other (Calogero 1960, Volume 3, 164–178, 
196–213). Animal thinking is visual thinking, a mode of thought linked to the senses 
and very different from human language-based verbal reasoning: unlike in human 
beings, in non-human animals there is no abstract synthesis between the intellective and 
communicative functions, through means of which language becomes the support for the 
articulation of thought. 
In philosophical terms, non-human animal thinking is a kind of noetic thinking, 
related to vision and intuition through images, and not dianoetic thinking, which is 
based on human language. Non-human animal thinking has no linguistic or conceptual 
abstraction, no analysis or synthesis of perceptive experience through vision: such 
abstractions are useless for life in its immediacy and are related mostly to specific human 
projects of dominion over Nature and other living beings.  
The specific character of human thinking is nothing but a synthesis of visual 
thinking and verbal language into verbal reasoning: this mode of thought has embedded 
visual thinking into a dialogical praxis, and successively in written text, thus also allowing 
for abstractions from life. 
Western philosophy, at least after Socrates, has developed through written culture, 
but other ethnophilosophies have been developing organically with life itself. That is, 
these ethnophilosophies are not philosophies elaborated through verbal reasoning 
within a written language: they are indeed, both literally and essentially, a worldview, a 
Weltanschauung, a “pre-understanding”2 gained through the very act of living, and not a 
rational representation of the world (Weltbild). Indeed, as already emphasized at least 
by Leibniz’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies, one can attribute a perspective worldview to 
all non-human animals,3 if not to every last monad that makes up part of the universe. If 
2  Cf. Heidegger’s lecture Die Zeit des Weltbildes (Heidegger 1950).
3  Cf. Nietzsche’s lectures Die vorplatonischen Philosophen as published in Holzer et al. (1913, 
Volume 3). The same lecture was re-published also in Oehler et al. (1924, Volume 4): Here Nietzsche 
refers to the work of biologist Karl Ernst Ritter von Baer (1792-1876).
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this is true, the concept of speciophilosophy may be introduced: there exists a multitude of 
philosophies, not only as related to different human ethnic groups, but to different species 
that hold different worldviews, different ways of thinking and living.   
Heidegger (1983) wrote that non-human animals are poor in the world, or worldless, 
but Heidegger had reduced the world to human existence, a phenomenon which holds 
meaning for human beings alone (Heidegger 1927/1977; 2001)4. This metaphysical 
conceptualization is entirely anthropocentric (see also Acampora 2006; Calarco 2008; 
Derrida 2006). Non-human animals are poor only in the human world: they experience 
another perception of the world, that is, a perception of another world. If moths and mice 
are incapable of reading human literature (moths and mice, however, understand books 
are derived from wood, rags or grasses), what could a human being hope to understand 
about the world of moths and mice? The human world is above all a cultural world, a 
world of concepts and signs: human beings have lost sight of the actual world, Nature has 
been obscured by culture. We look for conceptual meaning within every event and we live 
within the illusion that only our human language may enlighten us to reality itself, that 
is, we look at language as the house of being (Heidegger 1959). However, our conceptual, 
denotative language and our verbal reasoning have caused us to lose sight of Nature, to 
hide individual living beings behind abstractions and generalizations: in our languages, 
the single being is a determination (i.e., by article) of the universal concept of species, we 
do not consider a single mouse with its joys and sorrows, but only a sample of the concept 
of “mouse”. As such, the sign has erased the being.
4. Human Rational Philosophies as Projects of Dominion and 
Anthropocentric Ideologies
Not only does Western philosophy represent a limited viewpoint, but the entirety 
of human philosophies also only constitutes a particular species of philosophy. What 
characterizes human philosophies as a species? When our words are deprived of 
their living character, tied to their communicative function and evocative (poetic) or 
performative power, and assume a purely descriptive, denotative role, language replaces 
the actual world with a rational reconstruction of it: the actual world is substituted for a 
world of conceptual signs. In a deeper fashion than the Cartesian worldview, semiotization 
and “mathematization” reduce the world to a rational-linguistic reconstruction, a “world 
of concepts”, a substitutive representation5. 
Why did this substitution occur? There are two major reasons: to project human 
dominion over Nature and other living beings or to legitimate it through an anthropocentric 
representation of the world. These goals may be consciously declared or unconsciously 
4  That edited by F. W. von Herrmann (1977) was the first edition with marginal glosses of the so 
called Hüttenexemplar by Heidegger (see also Giannetto 2010).




Human philosophies are, for the most part, philosophies of victorious human 
apex predator, they are the semiotic devouring of other living beings, no longer forms of 
symbolism but of metabolism. Human philosophies are not only ideologies of a dominant 
class over other classes (Lukacs 1923), but also and more deeply ideologies of the 
dominant human species over other living beings, within a struggle not for existence but 
for supremacy, a struggle initiated by mankind itself. Human philosophies are ideologies 
because they represent and plan what is essentially a matter of dominance as a necessary 
condition of human existence. In this deeper ideological sense, all human philosophies 
are speciesist.
Thus, any critique of human philosophy cannot be but a destruction of human 
rational philosophies, because within their framework and that of verbal reasoning, 
language has been reducing the world and every living being to a world of signs and 
concepts: what Heidegger (1950) attributes to Descartes’ modern perspective  is only 
the explicit conscious form of a reduction intrinsic to verbal reasoning. Humans, as other 
Simians, like to simulate, but humans have actualized external simulations as theoretical-
conceptual or mathematical-experimental models to dominate Nature and other living 
beings. Any critique of reason cannot be but a destruction of reason, a destruction of 
concepts through concepts. Understanding of other living beings as well as the world can 
only emerge negatively through the destruction of the representative function of language, 
which constitutes a deformation of reality: this destruction can only be actualized through 
poetic thinking, through a poetic philosophy. Understanding other living beings, whether 
human and non-human, will only be possible through dialogue, that is, by using language 
in its original dialogical function; and, as there exist different human and non-human 
languages, it is fundamental to understand each different language by understanding 
each different worldview, that is, each different way of life.
5. Towards a Symphilosophein among Different Living Beings
This implies that one must give up any rational philosophy, any theoretical logos, 
by reconstituting philosophy as dialogical living philosophy, that is, philosophy as a 
praxis of dialogos. In any case, every human philosophy as mere human logos is a human 
speciophilosophy, one that cannot boast any pseudo-universal privilege to understand 
other living beings. 
A human philosophy as a dialogical praxis, that is a philosophy of dialogue (derived 
from Socrates and Feuerbach) (see also von Balthasar 1973; Bӧchenhoff 1970; Buber 
1984; Casper 2002) has been exposed by Guido Calogero in a non-ontological, non-
metaphysical form. Calogero (1950; 1962) also suggested the potential non-limitedness 
of the community of dialogue: dialogue has limits only insofar as one decides to interrupt 
dialogue by turning towards violence and dominion. It is absolutely necessary to interrupt 
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human murder, phagocytosis, violence, dominion, exploitation, imprisonment of other 
living beings, to liberate non-human beings and to open before them the possibility of a 
peaceful life as well as that of dialogue. Thus, one may consider a symphilosophein among 
human and non-human living beings as a praxis of dialogue, that is, a form of Calogero’s 
philosophy of dialogue extended to interspecies dialogue. This means that we as human 
beings must give up our way of living as carnivorous predators, we must change our way 
of life in a continuous effort to understand other living beings through actual universal 
love, through ethical reverence for life (Schweitzer 1923, Volumes 1–2).
We have no need of an onto-logical or biological definition or description of what 
a human or non-human being is: it is an ethical choice to show reverence for every 
individual life, one that may truly be recognized only through an ethical act. In contrast, 
ontological or biological definitions or descriptions, being reductions to objects, signs 
and concepts, are symbolically violent acts. We have a need for hermeneutical ethics, 
that is, a hermeneutical ethical praxis. If understanding is an ethical act and not a logical, 
gnoseological, ontological and metaphysical act, the whole of philosophy is ethics. We 
cannot understand without love and we cannot love without understanding: in this 
context, love means above all respect for otherness. We must nurture an absolute will to 
dialogue and become conscious of our living nature as universal Eros/Agàpe (Marcuse 
1955), which, independently from any ontological undecidable assumptions, wishes to 
consider all other living beings as interlocutors as well as subjects (persons without 
human cultural distortions) of life and love and not as things to be used as means to our 
ends. 
Such dialogue is always possible, because it should not be confined within our 
human language and it can exist even if our understanding is ever reciprocally partial 
and defective. There is no universal language and no translation is ever perfect (we 
often speak of the incommensurability of languages). However, there exists a language 
of gestures, of eyes and looks, of acts of love, of touch, body and sensation, which has no 
need for translation.
Thus, understanding non-human beings will not be possible within a human 
rational philosophy, but it will imply some kind of dialogue with non-human beings, by 
living an experience of “participant observation” (see Malinowski 2013) (extended from 
anthropology to ethology), to learn to understand different animal philosophies, different 
animal worldviews. We must reconsider ethology not as a scientific, detached discipline, 
but rather as an ethical praxis which implies actual participation as com-passion. 
Understanding other living beings means understanding other living beings’ modes 
of thought, that is, understanding their “philosophy of life”, which is one with their life: it 
means sharing their life through love and active care for them. 
A paradigm shift is called for: we must cease to elaborate human philosophy (or 
science) on other animals or other living beings, and we must seek a philosophy of pandas 
or elephants, a philosophy of jasmine or roses, to understand their own vital and ethical 
Enrico Giannetto
16
consciousness of the world. I believe that no living being was born a carnivorous predator, 
but became such by some choice of diet at some existential bifurcation (to survive by 
eating meat or die): there is no absolute nature/essence of living beings, but an evolution 
of them. Epigenetics (the study of heritable phenotype changes that do not involve 
alterations in the DNA sequence) now explain that phenotypic variations can switch genes 
on and off, thus producing inheritable alterations (Carey 2011). Carnivorous predators 
are not such by “nature”, but by evolution: carnivorism can be explained as an epigenetic 
effect, one that may be modified by a new way of living and eating. We must recognize 
that other animals, such as carnivorous predators like cats and dogs, have made a violent 
pact with human beings to share the fruits of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, 
to share the food of dominance, and have thereby distorted their philosophy of life into 
violence before us; but we must also recognize that many other living beings have never 
left the vital dimension of Eros/Agàpe.
Understanding this fact would mean understanding our own human philosophy 
in a new light, to see it as one with our life and no longer as theoretical, disinterested 
contemplation, as detached, distant vision, as indifference to what happens to other 
beings and to the world.
6. How Can We Understand Non-human Speciophilosophy?
How can we catch a glimpse of a non-human speciophilosophy? Can we develop this 
kind of understanding through human philosophy itself? Ancient philosophy sometimes 
appeared to imply a non-human worldview and way of life. One school of ancient 
philosophy was called Cynicism, but only out of a sense of disdain (Calogero 1933). If 
Cynicism had truly been the philosophy of living dogs, it would never have contemplated 
the ideals of self-sufficiency, non-compassion, indifference to the world and to other lives. 
It would never have postulated the eudemonistic, egoist absolute value of individual 
happiness, from which the non-ethical drift we today associate with the word “cynicism” 
followed. The analogy was limited to Diogenes’ way of living as a stray dog or to a generic 
impulse to live according only to Nature, free of cultural constraints. 
However, the time is ripe to truly understand animal philosophies, to respect all 
other living beings and even to improve our way of thinking and living. We must begin to 
learn from other animals, because we have lost our way as human beings.
Primeval Christianity has been associated by some historians with a sort of “Hebrew 
Cynicism”, in particular with regard to nomadism, “living as stray dogs”. However, any 
analogy with Greek Cynicism is misleading, because self-sufficiency (Calogero 1947), 
indifference or lack of compassion have no place in the life and teachings of Jesus. Jesus 
invited his followers to practice active love, to actively care for others, to be close to all 
beings within active love without difference of ethnic background or species (Luke 10: 
The neighbor is not an object of love, but a subject of love; the person who loves becomes 
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neighbor to any other), a teaching that culminated in suffering to death for the happiness 
of others and for the actualization of the Kingdom of God: here, according to the Bible 
(Isaiah 11:6-9), the wolf and the lamb will live together, without reciprocal violence, 
without devouring, among all living beings; in Mark 1:13 it is said that Jesus lived together 
with wild beasts.
Another metaphorical suggestion to understand different non-human 
speciophilosophies was given by Nietzsche (Acampora & Acampora 2003). Nietzsche 
indeed exalted a “philosophy of predators” who impose their will to power: he put value 
not in the ethically inconsequential fact of the common origin of all living beings as stated 
in the theory of evolution, but rather in the identification of the struggle for existence with 
the evolutive factor, even if in a non-mechanistic fashion (Giannetto 2010, Chapter 5). 
However, in the struggle for life he did not take the side of the beings who adapt themselves 
to the environment and live for their conservation and survival, but rather of those who 
live without fear of death and extinction and express their lust for power and dominance 
to the maximum degree6. Thus, Nietzsche wrote about Christianity as a “philosophy of life 
proper to gregarious lambs” for its meekness in the wake of the teachings of Jesus.
7. Primeval Christianity and the Philosophy of Lilies
On the contrary, Oscar Wilde gave a radical interpretation of the verses of Matthew 
6:25-34 in his De Profundis7: Jesus urged human beings to live like lilies of the field! Wilde 
wrote that one must live following what we could call the “philosophy of flowers”; and, 
we could add, following the “philosophy of the fowls of the air”. It is essential to give a new 
translation of these verses from the old Syriac and Palestinian Aramaic versions of the 
Matthew Gospel, which I believe constitute the original text on which the Greek text was 
translated (numbers indicate verses) (also see Miniscalchi Frizzo 1861 and Wilson 2003)8:
25 Indeed, I say unto you, Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what 
ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more 
than food, and the body than raiment? 26 Behold the fowls of the air: for they 
sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your Father of heaven 
giveth them food. b Shall ye not receive more than they? 27 Which of you by taking 
thought can add one hour to his/her life? 28 And why take ye thought for raiment? 
Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin. 
29 And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like 
one of these. 30 Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to day is, 
and to morrow is cast into the oven, shall God not care of you, O ye of little faith? 
31 Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? 
or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed? 32 For after all these things do the Gentiles 
6  Cf. Nietzsche’s essay Jenseits von Gut und Böse – Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft (1886), 
as well as Zur Genealogie der Moral, Eine Streitschrift (1887), as published in Colli and Montinari 
(1980).
7  Oscar Wilde wrote De Profundis in 1897 in prison and the first edition was published in 1905; 
the various versions and the original manuscript have been published in Small (2005, Volume 2).
8  However, I will give a new translation (a variation of the KJV version), because both these 
translations in Western languages were made to agree with the Greek text.
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seek. However, your Father of heaven knoweth that ye have need of all these 
things. 33 But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and its righteousness; and all these 
things shall be added unto you. 34 Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for 
the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is 
the evil thereof (modified King James version) (Matthew Gospel, 6:25-34).
These verses, read together with Leviticus 25:11-12 and 19-20, allow us to 
understand the teaching of Jesus: that one should always follow the practices which 
Leviticus dictated be followed only in occasion of the Jubilee. We no longer need to cultivate 
Earth’s soil, no longer need agriculture, and we can completely abandon ourselves to God 
for our own nutrition, by limiting it to what a non-cultivated soil spontaneously offers. 
However, Jesus adds a comparison to the fowls of the air: human ethical praxis must 
learn from the ethical praxis of the life of birds. Only a poet such as Oscar Wilde could 
understand the implications of these verses so completely, and in De Profundis he writes 
that we must live like flowers, like the lilies of the field which do not toil and do not spin. 
Jesus’s words show that birds’ and flowers’ ethical praxis and faith in God are greater than 
those of humans! Indeed, verse 6:26b as usually translated (Are ye not much better than 
they?), could seem to confirm human superiority in the eyes of God. However, one can read 
the original Aramaic text of the Vetus Syra (Cureton’s text) to discover that the common 
translation is deformed by an anthropocentric perspective: the Gospel’s text states simply 
that we as human beings will have more food than birds, because their nutrition is more 
limited to certain plant species. According to 6:28, we as human beings should not toil 
nor spin, that is, we should not work the soil for clothing and ornaments beyond food. All 
plant species are naturally magnificent without any cultivation and not even Solomon in 
all his glory was as adorned as one of the lilies. Looking for ornament is vanity in the literal 
sense of the word, because it is a vain task. We will never be able to surpass the beauty of 
flowers. Pulling them out of the soil or killing them to decorate ourselves or our houses 
is vain and a sign of envy. We humans cannot surpass or even reach their beauty. As for 
verse 30, which centers on the grass of the fields, much humbler than lilies, depicts God as 
less dismissive of the diminutive plant than the usual anthropocentric translation would 
imply (Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to day is, and to morrow is 
cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?).
Indeed, the original Aramaic text states that even what is destined to be food for 
mankind (what will be cast into the oven) – and here is an implicit contrast with the fowl 
of the air which may never be considered as food for human beings (thus clarifying the fact 
that Jesus considered a vegan diet to be suitable for human beings)9 – is clothed by God 
with more splendor than the most powerful human king, who has made his clothes out 
of the cultivated, spun product of plants and silkmoths; and God will clothe us naturally 
without any need of spun materials, without any need to kill silkmoths: God will clothe us 
9  That Jesus preached a vegan diet is shown by some agrapha (Asin y Palacios 1988/1990; 
Deleanu 2002, 25–35, 48).
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with the glory of heaven and of the Kingdom of God, because God takes care, God is Care 
for the whole of creation, for every creature.
Kierkegaard (1849/2016) also tried to give a philosophical, as well as a theological, 
content to these verses, but in a questionable way: he states that, while mankind does not 
know how to live in the present and in the instant, this is what the birds of the sky and 
flowers of the field do and what should teach to a human being. Following Kierkegaard, 
non-human beings are devoid of conscience and thus are also deprived of the sense of 
time.10 However, this is not true: they are not devoid of conscience, but only of discursive 
reason; nor do they lack the sense of time, but rather they live it fully, authentically, 
without binding fixations on the past and without distressing protrusions on the future 
life: they do not live like human beings determined by the anguish and non-acceptance of 
death which implies a violent behaviour.
If the birds of the sky and the flowers of the field lack this anguish of tomorrow and 
death, they too certainly suffer and do not live in an unconditional joy that Kierkegaard 
attributes to them. Only that the joy of all the little things in life is not ruined by the torment 
of tomorrow and death, and the suffering of everyday life is not amplified by that torment.
Kierkegaard then contrasts human silence with the silence of the birds of the sky 
and the flowers of the field: learning their silence would be tantamount to learning to 
keep silent and to understand that praying is not speaking and not just keeping silent but 
listening to God. 
However, certainly the birds of the sky do not speak nor they are silent, but they 
sing; and not even the grass and the flowers of the field are completely silent, but, swaying 
in the wind, with their own body they whisper: if the human language is above all of 
words-concepts, the animal language is of sounds-feelings and the language of the trees, 
of plants and flowers is a language of the body in being one with the forces of Nature such 
as wind, water, earth and sunlight.
Human beings no longer listen to Nature, but they only listen to the noise and to 
the chat of human discourses and they shun the silence in which we can hear “the voice 
of God”. However, from birds and flowers we can learn not only silence, but also the deep 
song of life: music and human poetry are at their origin a mimesis of these songs.
Thus, Christianity has an original, still-hidden dimension of universal ethics. 
Indeed, primeval Christianity was not a theoretical philosophy or a metaphysical theology. 
Christianity has no speciesist ontology11 and with the Franciscan revolution, when 
it managed to free itself from the intellectualistic Greek metaphysics it had fallen into 
through a process of Hellenization, it began deconstructing any theoretical philosophy 
which, from an unbiased observation, reveals itself to reduce every living being to an 
object of human thought (Blumenberg 1974). 
Today, Christianity can introduce mankind to a non-human and non-anthropocentric 
10  Almost the same argument is present in relation to the wolf in Rowlands (2008). 
11  A Christian theological anti-speciesism was elaborated by Linzey (1994).
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“living philosophy” in line with Jesus’s appeal to the “philosophy of the fowls of the air 
and the lilies of the field”, a philosophy of life which implies no possession, no property, 
no capital, no money, no violent work or dominance over Earth and its living beings, no 
violent phagocytosis of other beings: lilies do not fight for existence, as claimed by a 
deformed Darwinian predatory perspective; lilies live only by light and water being-in-
the-soil, waving in the wind which moves the field into resonance. Lilies do not live by 
mere contemplation, but rather by opening their existence to the sun and to the sky.
Through this, we can understand what Heidegger has taken from Angelus Silesius: 
“a rose is a rose” (as a verse of Gertrude Stein also states), without any reason. A rose 
simply exists and a human being authentically exists only when their existence is like 
that of a rose Heidegger (1957, 73). Only here does Heidegger seem to overcome his 
anthropocentrism. We should live without any goal external to life itself: life is a goal in 
and of itself. Any conceptual, external, final cause dooms us deviate from an authentic life. 
A final cause is an ulterior (covert) motive, which is abuse, dominance, violence towards 
life. Life is a self-propagating process, and not any individual being: its impulse is love, 
Eros/Agàpe. Living is loving, because love is the only act with no ulterior motive. We love 
simply to love. 
If an authentic human existence means existing like a rose, there is no hierarchy of 
living beings. There is no Heideggerian ontological difference between “Being” and beings, 
no substantial or essential difference among beings. There exists a variety of different 
beings: human beings, roses, horses and so on. There is no universal, unique “Being”: 
“Being” is simply a hypostasis of a linguistic relation, first operated by Parmenides (Calogero 
1936; 1967/2012; 1977): contingency is to be related to an irreducible multiplicity of 
beings. Understanding is a way of existing, that is, understanding is living: understanding 
is first of all understanding of other beings, reached through living dialogue.
8. Carnivorism as the Origin of Violence and Verbal Thinking  
as Virtual Devouring
Human philosophies are, for the most part, symbolic devouring. We are what we 
eat (Feuerbach 1866/1975, 357–407): if we eat other living animals and not the fruits 
of plants and trees, our flesh is constituted by the flesh of other living animals whose 
lives we have taken. As long as we remain carnivorous beings, our life is the result of 
violence and murder inflicted on other living animals: even the energy of a caress or of a 
kiss comes from this violence that constitutes our body, our very existence. Carnivorism is 
at the origin of inter-species and intra-species violence. We began by eating dead beings, 
then we turned ourselves into predators. As we became predators, we distorted our own 
pleasure function: we no longer feel pleasure only by eating to preserve our life, or by 
loving acts that transmit and create life, but as predators we associate the pleasure of 
eating to that of inflicting pain and death on living animals, whose status as objects of 
Towards a Non-human Speciophilosophy
21
prey is such that the pleasure of inflicting pain can be entirely divorced from the act of 
eating itself (delaying – even ad infinitum – the act of eating itself to make pleasure grow). 
Thus, violence can give pleasure and can be practiced on other human beings as well. 
Eisler (1951) has thus explained the rise of sadism from carnivorism (see also Giannetto 
2011), but indeed violence on every level can become an important part of our life, 
because our pleasure function has been distorted: violence can generate pleasure and 
increasing pleasure can be derived from the escalation of violence. Violence can be a self-
sustaining and self-incrementing pleasure. In this way, hunting and fishing can become 
sports, hobbies. The aimless violence of the Nazis, like a sort of hunt for human beings, 
can thus be explained by this distortion of pleasure.
However, there is more: what we think is what we eat, and our mode of thought is 
part of our metabolism process, our devouring. Thinking is a process which is one with 
living. Thus, thought is tied to the pleasure of living and loving. When the pleasure of 
living is related to the devouring of other animals and the infliction of pain and death 
on other beings, thought becomes involved in devouring, in its strategies of predation 
and dominance; indeed, it becomes a symbolic devouring as well as a strategy for actual 
devouring. Thinking as verbal reasoning is no longer an expression of Eros/Agàpe, but an 
expression of Thanatos: Eros is transformed into extroverted Thanatos (Marcuse 1955). 
Human culture is not a simple sublimation of Eros, but a form of Thanatos, a form of virtual 
devouring. The analysis operated by verbal reasoning is akin to a dismemberment of the 
body, as flesh is torn to pieces disassembled first through predation and then through 
metabolism: devouring becomes the transcendental material “condition of possibility” to 
understand verbal reasoning.
However, from Freud’s perspective, Eros seems to be circumscribed and forbidden 
in human life by a sociopolitical “principle of reality”, which threatens its actualization. 
Eros/Agàpe appears to be confined only to the human sphere, because a biological 
“principle of reality” (the struggle for life and inter-species violence) seems to negate the 
extension of Eros to relationships with other living beings. 
In contrast, Marcuse’s perspective deconstructs this idea of reality and necessity. 
Such a construct is only the absolutization of a particular historical, economic-socio-
political, evolutionary, anthropological and environmental condition, one which is 
indeed contingent. Marcuse makes a utopia real. This eschatological utopia of a future 
civilization, based on Eros/Agàpe and to be actualized through a multilevel revolution, 
builds its foundation in the memory of a primeval condition of non-carnivorous mankind. 
Indeed, since their appearance on the Earth, human beings have been thrown into an 
environmental condition of struggle for life: predatory animals have even hunted human 
beings. In such environmental context, even self-defense could have implied killing other 
preying animals. And mimesis, an imitation of these predators (i.e., wolves) could have 
transformed human beings into preying animals themselves. In any case, the partial or 
total lack of plant-based food within a particular environment could have induced human 
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beings to negate Eros/Agàpe within the inter-species sphere for the aim of individual 
survival, thus giving rise to a new species of human beings as predators. Human beings 
began by satisfying their hunger with the flesh of other already dead animals, like other 
animals who transformed into preying animals (probably via epigenetic switching of 
genes) and were taken as models by humans; they subsequently developed an addiction 
to the death of other animals and became slaves to flesh food, which transformed them 
into predators and killers of other animals. A living being would naturally “look for” 
death only to make sufferance cease (Thanatos). However, the death instinct which 
was previously part of Eros has been extroverted through a cultural solution: becoming 
predators and eating the flesh of other animals. This was not a necessary transformation: 
humans or other animals could have returned to an environment full of plant-based food, 
and thus to a vegetarian diet via the switching of genes. We have to understand Darwinian 
evolution within a new synthesis with epigenetics. The struggle for life in the sense of 
animal preying is only actualized when a certain animal wants to maintain constant, long-
term presence (in a timeframe relevant for nutrition) within an environment which does 
not allow for a vegetarian diet (i.e., arctic glaciers, desert zones or other environments 
unfit for human beings). There are fit- and unfit-for-vegetarian animal life environments: 
“natural selection” through struggle for life originally happens only within environments 
which are unfit for vegetarian animal life and therefore induce some animals to prey upon 
others.
The entire vital power an animal has to live and to be maximally happy is channeled 
against other animals, which must be captured, killed and reduced to food: it becomes 
violence, destructive power to be exerted on other living beings. The life instinct is thus 
converted into a compulsion to kill other living beings. The body is converted into a sort of 
“war-machine” armed against other forms of life. Pleasure is converted into a feeling tied 
to violence. The non-acceptance of one’s own individual death, even when living implies 
killing other living beings, externalizes the death instinct: it becomes a destructive 
instinct against others. The death instinct becomes autonomous from Eros/Agàpe and 
begins to oppose it: it becomes Thanatos. Life opposes death and so life opposes other 
lives. Life becomes enslaved by Thanatos and living is reduced to preying, to becoming an 
instrument of violence and death, will to power and supremacy, thus operating a distortion 
of pleasure, which becomes enslaved to dominance. The active principle of life, the vital 
energy of life, that is Eros, is not only subject to sublimation, but it is also converted into an 
instrument of death, into Thanatos. Rationalization thus represents not only the process 
of removing and repressing Eros, but also a legitimation of Thanatos. Existence becomes 
a struggle between Eros and Thanatos, and finally an ethical and political choice between 
life and death. Living an authentic, full human existence implies a revolution which allows 
for free non-human animal life.
 We are no longer conscious of this violence, because our lives are, for the most 
part, devoid of the direct violence of preying: we find flesh (often in no recognizable 
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form) to eat in supermarkets. Only a few human beings work as killers of non-human 
beings, and killing another animal implies a different kind of aggressive behaviour, due 
to the mechanization of violence and the act of killing using artificial machines. Thus, we 
become mostly unconscious of the origin of human violence in carnivorism (carnivorism 
is the original sin) (see Giannetto 2011) and we can be carnivorous without being directly 
violent (being non-aggressive), because we do not directly participate in the act of preying 
and killing. Paradoxically, this mechanization and industrialization of violence and killing 
– which has led to the highest level of violence and the systematic extermination of other 
living beings in human history – has also allowed for the detachment of carnivorism from 
violent behaviour, and with it the possibility of rejecting carnivorism itself in favor of a 
new, radically non-violent way of thinking.
9. Primeval Christianity, Lambs and a New Understanding 
 of the History of Philosophy
The history of Western philosophy can be understood in terms of peace and war 
between Greek intellectualistic theoretical philosophy and Christian voluntarism based 
on ethics of active love (Calogero 1933). Here, our interest lies not in the theological 
or religious truth of Christianity, but in the historical deconstruction of theoretical 
philosophy which Christianity had been operating and operates whenever it recovers its 
revolutionary roots. Thus, like Nietzsche, we can consider Christianity in its Hellenized 
form as a sort of simplified (anthropocentric) Platonism, or we can consider primeval 
Christianity as a living philosophy that deconstructed Greek theoretical philosophy with 
all its dualisms between soul and body, human beings and non-human beings. Indeed, 
modern vegetarianism and veganism as well as modern forms of anti-speciesist ethics, 
stemming not from the ancient Greek or oriental eudemonistic ideal of individual (egoistic) 
perfection but rather from active love and care, are the historical effect of secularized 
Christian ethics, extended to all non-human animals.
What we have recognized within the original Christian worldview as a practical 
philosophy12, – that is, a conscious ethical praxis of unlimited reverence for every form 
of life in spite of all differences, a Christian faith which is nothing but a moral faith unto 
other living beings, a faith which identifies itself with a personal and cosmic Love towards 
all living beings, no longer considered as objects of our thought, but living subjects like us 
(Calogero 1928/1985) –, is indeed a neglected non-human philosophy, like the philosophy 
of lambs so disdained by Nietzsche. 
Thus, the actual debate within Western philosophy is a symbolic debate among 
different, opposed, hidden non-human animal speciophilosophies: should we live like 
wolves (Eisler 1951), like blond predators13, or like lambs? We could employ a distinction 
12  Regarding the original Christian ethics (see also Giannetto 2005, Chapter 5; 2006).
13  Cf. Nietzsche’s essay Zur Genealogie der Moral, Eine Streitschrift (1887), as published in Colli 
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introduced by Albert Schweitzer (1923): on the one hand, we have an affirmation of the 
world and life as the philosophy of non-carnivorous, non-predatory animals; on the other 
hand, we have a negation of the world and life as the philosophy of carnivorous, predatory 
animals. From this point of view, Schopenhauer’s philosophy is only apparently (or only 
partially) nihilistic, by negating the egoistic will to live, whereas Nietzsche’s philosophy 
is indeed nihilistic, by legitimating the will to power over other living beings. Through 
his interpretation of Darwinism, Nietzsche showed the actual foundation of Hobbes’ 
homo homini lupus and of ancient Greek sophistic philosophy: the continuation of preying 
within the human species itself.
Humanistic, subjectivist, modern metaphysics was realized by Nietzsche into the 
self-legitimation of the will to power (Heidegger 1961).
Lambs are the paradigm of meekness, of the peaceful, non-violent way of living as 
outlined by Christianity. Thus, when one says that God is incarnated in Jesus and Jesus is 
presented as the Lamb of God because he was accused and imprisoned for his attack on 
the Temple in order to free lambs, doves and other sacrificial animals (Matthew 21:12-
13; Mark 11:15-18; John 2:14-17), and because he was brought as a lamb to the slaughter 
(Isaiah 53:7), one can also say that God incarnates into a Lamb: the Lamb is the living 
example of God as Cosmic Love for every creature. Other verses and other texts confirm 
this interpretation of the Gospel of Jesus (Giannetto 2005; 2006; 2012, 22-33; 2013, 75-
89). Let us analyze the translation of the Aramaic text of Matthew 18:1-14 (Miniscalchi 
Frizzo 1861; Wilson 2003):
1 At the same time came the disciples unto Jesus, saying, Who is the greatest in the 
kingdom of heaven? 2 And Jesus called a lamb unto him, and set him in the midst 
of them, 3 And said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as 
lambs, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. 4 Whosoever therefore shall 
humble himself as this lamb, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven. 5 And 
whoso shall receive one such lamb in my name receiveth me. 6 But whoso shall 
do evil to one of these little creatures which have faith in me, it were better for 
him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in 
the depth of the sea. 7 Woe unto the time-world because of evils! for it must needs 
be that evils come; but woe to that man by whom the evil cometh! [...] 10 Take 
heed that ye despise not one of these little creatures; for I say unto you, That in 
heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father of heaven. 11 For the 
Son of man is come to save that which was lost. 12 How think ye? if a man have 
an hundred sheep, and one of them be gone astray, doth he not leave the ninety 
and nine, and goeth into the mountains, and seeketh that which is gone astray? 
13 And if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he rejoiceth more of that sheep, 
than of the ninety and nine which went not astray. 14 Even so it is not the will of 
your Father of heaven, that one of these little creatures should perish (Matthew 
18:1-14).
In contrast to the usual translation from the Greek text, here the reference is not 
to a human child or human children, but to lambs. The Palestinian and Syriac Aramaic 
term is talià which indicates without any doubt a lamb as it does in Hebrew and Biblical 
and Montinari (1980).
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Aramaic (Isaiah 40:11 and 65:25). The Greek translation pais is at the very least generic, 
as it indicates a small creature, and is more probably anthropocentric. The influence of 
the Greek translation is such that Syriac Aramaic lexicons often do not record “lamb” 
as a possible meaning for talià, leaving “child” as the only option. The relevance of the 
lamb symbolism for Jesus in the New Testament confirms this translation; the following 
verses, expressing care for sheep, are further confirmation. We can also find evidence that 
the Aramaic text is the original one because of the wordplay, which is lost in the Greek 
text: “alà…talià…la taloùn” (“except … lamb… ye shall not enter”). The paradox of Jesus’s 
answer lies in the fact that he upturns all hierarchy, even of species, in such a way that 
a small creature such as a lamb becomes the greatest in the Kingdom of God. The term 
usually translated with “to offend” in fact means “to do evil” or “to kill”. Even lambs, Jesus 
says, have angels who protect them!
10. Blessing All Living Beings
Now we may give a new reading of the Aramaic blessing of Jesus (Matthew 5:3-12, 
Luke 6:20-23, Qs8, Diatessaron):
3 Blessed are those living beings who are poor in spirit: for theirs now shall be 
the kingdom of heaven. 4 Blessed are those living beings that mourn: for they 
now shall be comforted. 5 Blessed are those living beings who are meek and 
humble: they now shall inherit the earth. 6 Blessed are those living beings which 
do hunger and thirst with righteousness: they now shall be filled. 7 Blessed are 
those living beings who are merciful: they now shall obtain mercy. 8 Blessed are 
those living beings who are pure in heart: they now shall see God. 9 Blessed are 
those living beings who are peacemakers: they now shall be called the children 
of God. 10 Blessed are those living beings which are persecuted and preyed for 
righteousness’ sake: theirs now shall be the Grace of heaven. 11 Blessed are ye, 
when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil 
against you falsely, for my sake. 12 Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: great now shall 
be the Grace over you in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were 
before you.
These words are the opening of the so-called “Sermon on the Mount” attributed to 
Jesus, and they are present even in the most ancient sources of the Gospels: the Gospel of 
Matthew, source Q and the Diatessaron. These words are blessing (Aramaic tuvà) words. 
In some languages, they are interpreted as wish-words of happiness: this is a misleading 
mistake, because Christian ethics is not eudemonistic like Greek ethics, it does not have 
the egoistic goal of happiness. Christian happiness can imply personal suffering for the 
happiness of other beings, for the realization of the Kingdom of God, where justice is 
realized for all living beings, where no evil shall be present and all creatures shall live 
together in peace, like the wolf and the lamb, and without any devouring (Isaiah 11:6-9). 
Blessing does not imply the goal of a reward. This interpretation of the blessing words 
of Jesus is also influenced by translations from the Tanakh or Ancient Testament or even 
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from Qumran texts in terms of wishes of happiness (Siracides or Ecclesiastic. 14:1-2 
and 20-27, 15:1-10; Qumran verses 4Q418 81:14, 4Q525 2:1-10, 1QH VI:2-5). There is 
no for as a final clause of the blessing in the Aramaic text, no logic of egoistic reward. 
The Christian Palestinian Aramaic text has a fundamental adverb neglected in Greek 
translations: now. That is, the future is just now: the Kingdom of God shall be here and 
now! Eschatological fulfillment is just now: no quietism, no waiting for a supernatural 
paradise. These misleading translations were the fruit of the process of Hellenization and 
Platonization of Christianity, which grants happiness in the celestial future after death. 
The immediate actualization of the Kingdom of God is a revolutionary upturning of the 
hierarchies of ethnicity, of sex, of economic and social class, of political and religious 
power, of species. No woe is present into the original text: when Jesus says (Luke 6:28) 
“Bless them that curse you”, it is evident that the verses in Luke 6:24-26 must be regarded 
as later additions (interpolations) due to a vindicating spirit different from that expressed 
by Jesus.
However, the greatest misleading mistake in translation was to give a purely human 
connotation to the subjects of Jesus’s blessing. These words of blessing could well be 
the most important words of our Western culture, and their meaning was obscured by 
anthropocentrism and speciesist ideologies. For too long has Christianity been reduced 
to an anthropocentric and speciesist doctrine, but Nietzsche understood it in one respect: 
it is a philosophy of lambs.
Now we can truly understand the blessing of Jesus in a revolutionary way: only 
verses 11-12 have a specific human connotation. The reference to poor beings (5:3) is first 
of all to the fowls of the air and the lilies of the field, who do not accumulate wealth. The 
reference to beings that mourn (5:4) is first of all to the non-human animals who suffer 
oppression, exploitation, murder and devouring. The reference to inheriting the Earth 
(5:5) is first of all to the meek and humble living beings such as lambs or calves, because 
human beings have torn the Earth from them. The reference to hunger and thirst (5:6) 
is not an abstract desire for justice, but rather a call to the living beings which eat and 
drink in justice, which do not eat flesh and do not drink the blood of other animals. The 
reference to merciful beings (5:7) is to the living beings which have pity for the suffering 
of others and take care of them, which do not prey and do no kill. Purity of heart (5:8) is 
contrasted with the purity required for the Temple sacrifice of non-human animals. The 
reference to peacemakers (5:9) is to the living beings which do not prey upon and do not 
devour other animals, beings like lambs which already live as dictated by Isaiah 1:6-9 and 
65:25, which describe the so-called messianic peace. 
If we share the speciophilosophy of lambs and not that of wolves, we shall be able to 
engage in dialogue with all other living beings. And we shall be able to produce the required 
switching of the genes of carnivorism by feeding plant-based food to carnivorous animals 
for a due time, as dictated by evo/devo (evolution/development) dynamics (Giannetto 
2010, Chapter 17). Symphilosophein shall be like when Albert Schweitzer played the organ 
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in the African forest and the voices of birds and other animals sang along with it.
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